

Evolving Parties

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Abstract

This paper explores the reasons why factions within political parties might choose to split and when instead party unity is expected. We develop a theory based on the premise that political factions aim to preserve and cultivate their individual brands. In the model, two factions can belong to the same party or not. When together, factions can decide to split. A split sets in motion the evolution of factions' individual brands, which can be positive or negative. When apart, factions can decide to merge. By merging, factions reap a benefit from being together, but need to divide party resources according to their relative strength. We characterize when splits and mergers are stable—reflecting fragmented and non-fragmented party systems respectively—and when instead cycles emerge in equilibrium. Factions may want to split even if by doing so they hurt their brand. These damaging splits, we show, only happen when factions anticipate re-merging in the future: by merging, the splinter faction might gain either by becoming the bigger fish in a smaller pond or the smaller fish in a bigger pond.

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1. Introduction

Political parties are not monolithic entities (Boucek, 2009). Rather, they are composed of different factions, each with their own structure and organization, and holding specific preferences that might differ from those of the broader party. This factionalism is an important driver of the fluidity of multiparty systems. Conflicts between different factions in the same party can lead to splintering, contributing to the system's fragmentation and instability; conversely, different groups may choose to merge together within the same party, aiding in the consolidation of the system. Such splits and mergers are quite frequent in multiparty systems. In Europe, mergers have occurred on average every third electoral period since World War II, and splintering is even more common (Ibenskas, 2016).

In some cases, factional splits are easy to understand as the newly formed splinter party goes on to be very successful, attract supporters from the original party and potentially cause a shift in the balance of power. Consider for example the history of the UK Labour party. In the 1980s, a group of centrist Labour Party MPs broke away and formed the Social Democratic Party, citing concerns over the party's leftward shift. The split ultimately led to the formation of the Liberal Democrats, which grew to be an important political force in the UK.

Other cases are more puzzling, as the splinter party fails to gain significant support or influence. For example, in 2017, Pierluigi Bersani, the former leader of the Italian *Partito Democratico* (PD), departed from the party. Alongside a group of like-minded politicians, he founded a new political party called *Articolo 1*, positioning it as a left-wing alternative to the more centrist PD. This split had significant repercussions for both parties involved. While the PD lost several of its left-leaning members to the new party, thus weakening its position in Italian politics, *Articolo 1* struggled to gain momentum and failed to make a significant impact in subsequent elections. Interestingly, *Articolo 1*'s poor electoral performance was widely anticipated, but it did not deter the split from occurring.¹

¹In a public interview, Bersani explained the necessity of establishing a separate political entity, despite the grim electoral prospects: <https://www.ilfattoquotidiano.it/2017/02/28/scissione-bersani-perche-abbiamo-detto-addio-al-pd-con-renzi-stavamo-andando-a-sbattere-contro-un-muro/3420638/>.

This paper presents a theory of party evolution that focuses on factions’ incentives to stay together or apart. We characterize the circumstances under which parties are stable and the conditions under which, instead, we should observe factional splintering. Our theory can account for both intuitive cases of party splits where the splinter party is successful and for puzzling cases whereby the split is initiated by a faction that does not expect to gain electorally. Furthermore, we identify cases in which different parties may merge to form a new political entity. Existing theories of party system evolution usually emphasize the impact of exogenous changes in institutions or voter demands. We provide a new perspective by emphasizing the supply-side effects generated by factions’ dynamic incentives, which emerge even absent such exogenous changes.

Our theory starts from the observation that different factions within the same party have distinct identities, characterized by their unique ideologies or policy positions, as well as their separate resources, organizational capacities, and bases of support in the electorate (Clarke, 2020). We refer to these distinguishing characteristics as a faction’s *brand*. While they operate under the umbrella of the broader party, establishing a strong brand allows the different factions to “construct a network of political support independent of party influence. Party sub-branding is thus a crucial element in the factional politics of resource capture.” (Clarke, 2020, p. 456). As such, the strength of a faction’s brand determines its relative power within the party, as well as its expected success if the faction decides to split and run alone. Against this backdrop, a primary consideration for a faction is the need to preserve and cultivate its own brand.

In particular, deciding to split from the main party can either strengthen or weaken a faction’s brand, as the examples above illustrate. Splitting allows a faction to freely establish its separate ideological identity, potentially enhancing its unique brand by increasing the ideological clarity of its manifesto (Lo, Proksch and Slapin, 2016). Additionally, a faction can build its brand by capitalizing on increased attention and the opportunity to more directly allocate its resources toward improving its standing with the electorate. However, maintaining a successful brand post-split also requires the faction to consolidate its image and establish a viable identity separate from the original party, which can be challenging without the resources or structural support of the larger party. Voters may also penalize the split itself or punish the new party for an ideological position less in line with their own (Duell et al., 2023). find the faction’s new,

independent ideological stance less appealing. Our model allows us to analyze how such strategic considerations influence the stability or instability of political parties.

Formally, we study the repeated interaction between two factions that belong to the same ideological camp. In each period in which factions are together, they can unilaterally decide to split, forming a separate party. In each period in which factions are split, they can merge again if they both agree to do so. Within the party, each faction is characterized by a brand that captures its ideological identity, political capital, resources, and network of donors. As described above, deciding to split (or merge) affects the evolution of this brand. We assume that factions can perfectly anticipate the consequences of a split on their respective brands.²

Whether they split or stay together, the factions' brands influence their payoff. When factions split, their brand determines their electoral strength. When they are together, their brand contributes to the strength of the party *and* influences the internal division of the spoils (exogenously in the baseline model, and endogenously in an extension where the division is determined by bargaining between the factions). Further, net of their brands, when factions are in the same party they enjoy an efficiency gain, i.e., the party's strength is more than the sum of the individual factions'. For instance, we could think of this gain as a consequence of institutional factors such as the electoral system's disproportionality.

Our analysis uncovers a rich set of equilibria. Recall that factions can anticipate the consequences of a split on their respective brands. Intuitively, then, if splits are too damaging to factional brands, in equilibrium we have a stable party with no splits. In contrast, if a faction benefits a lot from a split, then we will have a split at the beginning of the game, with this fragmented system stable over time.

Suppose instead that the impact of a split on the factions' brands is not too detrimental or too beneficial. Here, we find that the equilibrium must exhibit cycles. The two factions (which belong to the same party at the beginning of the game) split today only to re-merge tomorrow. Importantly, these cycles are not caused by shifts in environmental conditions that alter the factions' statically optimal strategy. Rather, cycles are driven solely by the faction's dynamic

²We discuss in Section 3 how introducing uncertainty may impact our results.

incentives. Furthermore, we find that in our model a cycling equilibrium can emerge even (yet not only) if the splinter faction's brand is *damaged* by the split in the first period.

To see why, suppose that splitting damages both factions' brands. Then, when the factions reunite in the second period, the party is weaker than if it had remained unified. However, one faction may still choose to split if it believes that doing so will cause more harm to its opponent. In this case, the splinter faction is prepared to incur a cost in the present to improve its relative position within the party in the future, even if this harms the party as a whole. Notice that this damaging split may only be sustained in anticipation of a future re-merger (i.e., as part of a cycle), which is incentivized by the efficiency premium factions enjoy when running together. Importantly, this type of cycle continues to emerge when the division of the pie is bargained over by the factions.

This result provides a potential rationale for the split of *Articolo 1* from Italy's Democratic Party (*PD*). As anticipated, this split primarily benefited the opposing right-wing camp. Bersani, acknowledging this, often referred to the split as part of a long-term strategy: "It's legitimate to think that we are barking at the moon, there are no tangible results yet. We're doing this more for future memory than for the concrete present."³ In line with our theory, the split was viewed as a temporary evil rather than a permanent break. Indeed, Bersani himself often suggested that *Articolo 1* would be open to rejoining the *PD* in the future under the right conditions.⁴ These conditions realized in 2023, when *Articolo 1* merged back into a weakened *PD* from a position of relative strength.

One might think that the trade-off of splitting versus staying together in the first period applies only to the faction that expects to improve its relative standing within the party, and that the faction who stands to lose bargaining power always prefers to remain in the party. Perhaps surprisingly, we instead show that splits could also be initiated by the faction that expects to weaken its relative position, as part of an equilibrium cycle. This happens when the

³Party national assembly, November 16, 2019 (minute 9): <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=T5rrWSuyH6M>. In another interview, the former party secretary acknowledges that a splinter party associated with more progressive platforms could backfire in the short term (in a world where liberal platforms are still considered more popular): <https://video.repubblica.it/dossier/referendum-costituzionale/riforme-bersani-vi-spiego-che-significa-non-vedere-la-mucca-in-corridoio/257880/258158>.

⁴For example, in this interview Bersani considers re-entering the *PD* as a potentially interesting perspective: <https://www.repubblica.it/politica/2022/04/24/news/articolo1>.

cycle damages the splinter faction's brand, but benefits the other one and the entire party. Here, the splinter faction is willing to temporarily distance itself to allow the other to consolidate its brand, so that the party can become stronger in the future. This is done in anticipation of reuniting in the future to enjoy the gains, which will be a smaller portion of a larger pie.

This type of cycle provides a potential framework for interpreting the evolution of the Japanese Democratic Party (DP), the Party of Hope (PH) and the Constitutional Democratic Party of Japan (CDP). Faced with challenging electoral prospects, the DP declared they would not contest the 2017 election and would instead merge with the newly-formed PH. Interestingly, the leadership of the PH refused to admit the more progressive members of the DP, effectively inducing a split that led to the formation of the CDP.⁵ The PH then went on to establish itself as a centrist party, while the CDP adopted a more extreme brand. The PH's refusal to join forces may seem puzzling, in light of the fact that the CDP immediately emerged as a much stronger electoral presence (winning almost twice as many seats in the House of Representatives). According to our framework, the split was part of a long-term strategy, aimed precisely at allowing the CDP to establish its electoral progressive brand, with the goal of joining forces again in the future once the gains would be consolidated. Indeed, the CDP ultimately became the second-largest party, and the primary center-left party. In line with a 'smaller fish in bigger pond' logic, the PH, which rebranded as the Democratic Party for the People in 2018, eventually merged back into the CDP in 2020, becoming a less influential faction within a larger party.

Finally, we build on our main results to analyze the effect of institutions on party evolution and the fragmentation of the party system. First, we look at the impact of electoral institutions, in particular the proportionality of the electoral system. The classic Duvergerian intuition suggests that increasing the disproportionality of the system should discourage splits, by increasing the efficiency premium the factions gain by staying together (Duverger, 1951). This intuition remains valid in our framework if factions are myopic, but may fail when we consider their dynamic incentives. To see why, consider a cycling equilibrium sustained by the first, 'bigger fish in smaller pond' dynamic. If a faction can initiate a split today expecting to re-merge tomorrow from a stronger bargaining position within the party, increasing the value of the pie will only

⁵<https://www.japantimes.co.jp/opinion/2017/11/13/commentary/japan-commentary/koikes-new-political-party-lost-hope/>.

strengthen its incentives to split. Scholars have often pointed out that Duvergerian patterns are not always observed in the data (see, e.g., [Cox, 1997](#); [Singer, 2013](#); [Diwakar, 2007](#)). Existing explanations argue that the predictions may fail when voters, or parties, do not behave strategically or are unable to solve coordination problems ([Cox, 1997](#); [Ordeshook and Shvetsova, 1994](#)). In contrast, our theory highlights that it is precisely due to factions' strategic incentives that Duverger's intuition may fail in a dynamic world.

Our analysis of the effect of parties' internal institutions reveals similarly counterintuitive findings. Making the party organization less egalitarian (or increasing ideological divisions in the party) will only encourage a split initiated by the faction expecting to become a bigger fish in a smaller pond. This happens because the cycle is sustained by the splinter's incentive to become stronger, and a less egalitarian internal organization sharpens this incentive. In contrast, if a cycle is sustained by a 'smaller fish in bigger pond' dynamic, decreasing intra-party power sharing reduces splits, because in this case the splinter faction's cost of damaging its relative power is amplified. These findings are in line with the mixed results from the empirical literature (e.g., [Key, 1949](#); [Burden, 2004](#)), again emphasizing how considering factions' dynamic incentives may be crucial in fully understanding observed patterns of parties' evolution.

In concluding this section, let us emphasize that we are not implying that the evolution of political parties is solely based on individual factions' incentives to cultivate their brand. Existing research has emphasized the role of institutional factors such as electoral systems ([Golder, 2006a,b](#); [Blais and Indridason, 2007](#)), and changes in voter preferences ([Rokkan and Lipset, 1967](#); [Pedersen, 1979](#); [Taagepera and Grofman, 2003](#); [Invernizzi, 2023](#)) as drivers of party system dynamics. By highlighting the importance of factional brand cultivation, we complement this literature and offer new lens through which understand the evolution of political parties.

2. Literature Review

Our theory is based on the premise that parties are not monolithic entities, but are internally divided into competing factions. The formal literature has increasingly acknowledged the importance of factions to understand political parties' nomination processes ([Caillaud and Tirole, 2002](#); [Crutzen, Castanheira and Sahuguet, 2010](#); [Hirano, Snyder Jr and Ting, 2009](#)), intra-party

power sharing (Invernizzi, 2022; Invernizzi and Prato, 2024), and competition, both over resources (Persico, Pueblita and Silverman, 2011) and ideology (Izzo, 2023). We share with this literature the focus on within-party actors, political factions. We show how considering factional incentives to develop their brand leads to unexpected predictions on party evolution.

The literature on American and comparative politics has put forward a few alternative hypotheses for why parties emerge and change. One approach focuses on the demand side, highlighting voters' heterogeneous preferences as the key explanation for party emergence. According to this primordialist account (Rokkan and Lipset, 1967), parties originate as a consequence of social cleavages. The more numerous the cleavages, the higher the number of parties, and new parties emerge as a consequence of new cleavages.

An opposite “top-down” approach is the one taken by Downs (1957) and subsequently revisited by Aldrich (1995), according to whom parties are set in motion by career concerned politicians who need an institutional machinery to support them in elections and once in office. In this tradition, Snyder and Ting (2002) study how the party leadership uses control of the party platform to more effectively signal the candidates' preferences to voters. Levy (2004) analyzes party formation in the presence of a multidimensional policy space, where policy-motivated politicians can form coalitions (parties) to credibly commit to a broader set of policies (the Pareto set of the coalition). We also model party formation, and dissolution, as a top-down process. Our focus on party evolution as a result of the factions' incentives to cultivate their individual brand distinguishes our paper from existing works.

Related models of party system change have typically focused on *party entry* as a determinant of change. For instance, Buisseret and Van Weelden (2020) study how an outsider candidate decides to enter the electoral contest (either via primaries or via a third-party), while Kselman, Powell and Tucker (2016) focus on party entry in Proportional Representation systems. In contrast, we focus on the determinants of party system change that arise from the incentives of existing parties to split or merge. Closest to our model, Forand and Maheshri (2015) consider how party systems evolve in a dynamic setting under different electoral systems. In their model, dynamic considerations arise due two key ingredients: exogenous stochastic changes to voters' ideological preferences, and frictions in the electoral process for newly formed parties (i.e., an

electoral penalty and higher resource demands). We complement this paper by focusing on factions’ dynamic incentives to cultivate their brand, which leads to new theoretical findings such as cycles of splits and mergers.

Finally, our paper connects to research on party switching, where candidates or legislators change party affiliation. This literature focuses on the incentives of individual politicians, emphasizing the immediate electoral, office, and policy benefits and costs associated with party switching (e.g., [Desposato, 2006](#); [Mershon and Shvetsova, 2013a,b](#)). Our theory differs in two respects. First, we highlight the importance of considering actors’ dynamic incentives, showing that we may observe party splintering even when it is costly in the short-run. Second, we think about coordinated groups of party members (i.e., factions), rather than individual politicians, as the key actors. As such, our model can inform recent empirical work that analyzes collective switches from legislatures into new parliamentary groups.⁶

3. A model of Party Evolution

We study the interaction between two factions, i and j , belonging to the same (left-wing) ideological camp. The game has two periods, $t = 1, 2$. At the beginning of the game, the two factions are together in the same party, so the party and camp coincide. In each period in which factions are together, they can unilaterally decide to split and form a separate party. In each period in which factions are split, they can merge again if they both agree to do so. For clarity of exposition, we begin by assuming that only faction i can initiate a split. Below, we analyze an extension where both factions are allowed to split.

Factions’ Brands. In each period, each faction is characterized by a brand, b_t^i and b_t^j , reflecting its ideology, resources and basis of support in the electorate. For simplicity we assume that the factions have the same initial ‘stock’ of brand: $b_0^i = b_0^j = b_0 > 0$. The evolution of these brands then depends on the factions’ decision to split or merge in a given period. In particular, if factions are together at t , their individual brands remain fixed:

$$b_t^i = b_{t-1}^i \quad \text{and} \quad b_t^j = b_{t-1}^j.$$

⁶See the Party Instability in Parliaments (INSTAPARTY) Project: <https://instapartyproject.com>.

In every period t in which they are split, faction i 's (j 's) brand instead evolves by a positive factor k^i (k^j):

$$b_t^i = b_{t-1}^i k^i \quad \text{and} \quad b_t^j = b_{t-1}^j k^j.$$

If $k^i > 1$, then a split helps faction i to build its own brand. If instead $k^i < 1$, then a split damages the faction's individual brand.⁷

We emphasize that the assumption that the factions' brands do not evolve while they are in the same party is solely for notational simplicity. Our theory's key ingredient is that the brands' evolution is *different* depending on whether factions are together or apart. Then, we can interpret the parameters k^i and k^j as representing the *net* effect of a split. We briefly return to this point in Section 7.3 below.

Payoffs. A faction's brand influences its payoff not only when it decides to run independently but also when it operates within the larger party structure. Formally, let u_t^i be faction i 's payoff in period t (the utility u_t^j for faction j is defined symmetrically). Then:

$$u_t^i = \begin{cases} (b_t^i + b_t^j + \alpha_m r^t) \left[\frac{1}{2} + \phi(b_t^i - b_t^j) \right] & \text{if in the same party in } t \\ b_t^i + \alpha_s r^t & \text{if running alone in } t \end{cases} \quad (1)$$

When factions remain within the same political party, their payoff is commonly linked to the overall strength of the party. However, the distribution of rewards among factions is influenced by the relative strength of their respective brands.

The strength of the party, $(b_t^i + b_t^j + \alpha_m r^t)$, can be understood as a function of two elements. First, the strength of its brand, which is simply the sum of the brands of the two composing factions, b_t^i and b_t^j ; second, an exogenous component that captures the overall strength of the ideological camp in a given time period, $r^t > 0$. When r is greater than 1 the camp is gaining support over time, whereas when r is less than 1 the camp is losing support. We think of r^t as capturing loyalist voters, who ideologically identify with the left-wing camp and are already

⁷Of course, it could be that shifts in factions' brands differ across periods. While we model these shifts as time-independent, our results are robust to allowing the k s to change over time.

committed to voting for a left-wing party in period t . Other voters, instead, may support the party because of its specific platforms, resources, or the attractiveness of its candidates. These elements are captured by the party's brand, $b_t^i + b_t^j$. Finally, as we describe in more detail below, the parameter $\alpha_m > 0$ captures an efficiency premium reaped by factions when staying merged.

The factions' brands also determine the internal division of the spoils within the party, with the parameter $\phi \geq 0$ indicating the payoff elasticity to factional strength. A higher ϕ may thus capture a less egalitarian party organization where resource distribution heavily depends on factions' relative power. It may also represent more significant ideological divisions, increasing the cost for weaker factions to maintain their disadvantaged position. Finally, a higher ϕ may indicate more intense rent-seeking motivations, which incentivize factions to improve their bargaining power within the party even absent ideological divisions. We note that ϕ is appropriately bounded to ensure that a faction's share of rents is between 0 and 1. In particular, we assume that $k^i, k^j \in [0, \bar{k}]$, and $\phi < \frac{1}{2k^2}$. While in this baseline model the intra-party division of the pie is exogenous and fixed across periods (according to the parameter ϕ), in an extension (Section 7.2) we consider a setting where in each period this division is determined by a bargaining process between factions, regardless of the value of ϕ .

Finally, suppose that factions split in period t . When a faction runs alone, its strength is determined by its own brand and the strength of the camp as a whole. Obviously, when running alone each faction gets to keep the entirety of the pie it gains. Thus, i 's payoff if split in period t is $b_t^i + \alpha_s r^t$. We will make the assumption that $\alpha_m > 2\alpha_s$ in this context, to represent the efficiency premium that results from the two factions joining forces. In other words, the overall strength of the party is more than the sum of the individual components. In this setting, the difference $\alpha_m - 2\alpha_s$ could represent institutional factors, such as the degree of disproportionality in the electoral system, creating economies of scale that incentivize factions to stay together. In a highly disproportional electoral system, for example, the advantage of belonging to a larger party is significant, as the party's combined vote share translates into an even larger number of seats. To reduce notation and simplify the exposition of the results, we will set α_s to zero. Thus, a higher efficiency premium is captured by a larger value of α_m .

Timing. To sum up, the timing of the game is as follows:

1. Period 1

1.1 i decides whether to split and run alone, or remain in the party

1.2 Factions receive their first-period electoral payoffs

2. Period 2

2.1 Split/merge decisions

- If split in period 1, i decides whether to remain split or ask j to merge. If i wants to merge and j agrees, factions re-merge. Otherwise, factions remain split
- If no split in period 1, i decides whether to split and run alone or remain in the party

2.2 Factions receive their second-period electoral payoffs

The history of the game at the beginning of period t (h_t) is then the list of split/merge decisions up to period t . A strategy for faction i determines i 's action after every possible history. We focus on subgame-perfect Nash equilibria of the game.

Discussion of the Assumptions

In our model, k^i and k^j represent, in reduced form, how splits affect factions' political success. Notice that we allow, in principle, both factions to be damaged by a split, or both to profit from it. The underlying assumption is that the electoral performance of the two factions is not the result of a zero-sum game.

As a potential microfoundation, imagine that at the onset of the game each faction's base of potential supporters is composed of three groups. First, a solid core, that mobilizes whether factions are together or apart. Second, a group of potential abstainers, that may fail to mobilize if dissatisfied with the faction's image or actions after a split. Importantly, it needs not be the case that all the voters in this group would support the opposing faction if they fail to be mobilized by the splinter. Finally, and symmetrically to the previous group, the third group contains voters that may be mobilized when a faction splits from the party. As above, it needs not be the case that all the voters in this group are 'stolen' from the opposing faction's potential supporters.

Then, depending on the size and compositions of the three groups, a split may benefit both factions, neither, or benefit one while hurting the other.⁸

Figure 1 complements this discussion by illustrating that examples of all four possible scenarios are observed in real-world political parties. First, both factions may be damaged by a split, $k^i < 1$ and $k^j < 1$. This case is illustrated by the evolution of the already mentioned Italian Democratic Party, where both the parent party and the splinter *Articolo 1* recorded disappointing electoral performances following the split. Second, both factions may benefit, $k^i > 1$ and $k^j > 1$. As an example of this case, consider the exit of the notorious ‘Gang of Four’ UK Labour Party moderates, who left Labour to found the the Social Democratic Party (SDP). While the split initially caused upheaval within the Labour Party, both Labour and the SDP ultimately benefited from going their separate ways, as it allowed each party to appeal to different segments of the electorate.




Figure 1 – Typology of different splits, as a function of the value of k^i and k^j , each factions’ per-period shift in brand.

Third, the splinter may benefit, $k^i > 1$, but hurt the parent party, $k^j < 1$. An example of this is the split within the Italian Socialist Party (PSI) in the early 1920s, which led to the formation

⁸This is in addition to changes in the overall ideological leaning in the electorate, captured in our model by the parameter r^t .

of the Communist Party of Italy (PCI) and the subsequent decline of the PSI. While the PCI benefited from the support of radical socialists and emerged as a significant political force in interwar Italy, the PSI experienced a constant decline in influence and electoral support. Finally, the splinter may suffer, $k^i < 1$, but the opposing faction may benefit, $k^j > 1$. The trajectory of the Japanese Party of Hope (PH) and the Constitutional Democratic Party of Japan (CDP) illustrates this case. As previously described, both descended from the Democratic Party, and the split was effectively initiated by the PH's refusal to admit the more progressive members, who went on to form the CDP. While the conservative PH lost electoral support following the split, establishing a more progressive brand benefited the Constitutional Democratic Party, which became one of the most influential parties in Japan.

Finally, let us highlight that in our setup factions can perfectly foresee the consequences of a split for their relative brands (i.e., k^i and k^j are known). Of course, in real life these splits inevitably involve some uncertainty. A split influences a faction's brand because it involves a reallocation of party resources and voter attention, and potentially allows the faction to establish a new ideological identity. The full consequences of this process may only realize once the split actually occurs, and may be hard to precisely anticipate. We abstract away from this uncertainty in order to more clearly illustrate the mechanism behind the results, and show that dynamic incentives may generate splits in equilibrium even if factions have a strong expectation that this will be costly in the short run (i.e., the split is statically damaging).⁹ As long as the uncertainty is not too big (e.g., assuming that players' priors are sufficiently precise) our qualitative conclusions remain valid. In concluding the paper, we then briefly discuss how a large amount of uncertainty (e.g., considering priors with a high variance) may enrich our dynamics.

4. Analysis

We assume that both factions are already merged into a single party at the outset of the game. The aim of the analysis is then to examine how this party evolves over time. Specifically, we seek to identify the conditions under which the following scenarios occur:

⁹Factions' expectations about the consequences of the split may be hard to observe, but a good proxy could come from surveys of the likeability of different factional leaders, which are often conducted even absent a split.

1. A stable, non-fragmented party, where the factions remain merged in both periods;
2. An unstable party, where the factions remain merged in the first period but split in the second;
3. A stable fragmentation, where the factions split in the first period and do not re-merge;
4. Cycles of fragmentation, where the factions split in the first period and subsequently re-merge in the second.

Before fully characterizing the equilibrium, let's examine the strategic incentives that factions encounter in this setting. To do so, it is useful to start from a *static* benchmark. Suppose that factions only consider their current period payoff. Assuming for simplicity that faction j would agree to a merger (or that factions are already merged at the beginning of the period), i would choose to split in period t if and only if

$$b_{t-1}^i k^i > \left(b_{t-1}^i + b_{t-1}^j + \alpha_m r^t \right) \left[\frac{1}{2} + \phi (b_{t-1}^i - b_{t-1}^j) \right], \quad (2)$$

The faction's incentives in this static benchmark are quite straightforward. If k^i is large enough, the faction will gain a lot from running alone and will therefore choose to split from the party. On the other hand, if k^i is small, the faction will choose to remain within the party. It is important to note that, when $b_{t-1}^i = b_{t-1}^j$ (as is the case in our setting in period 1), condition 2 can never be satisfied if $k^i < 1$. Such damaging splits hurt the faction in the current period, hence would not emerge in equilibrium with myopic factions.

The comparative statics in this benchmark case are also intuitive. A larger α_m signifies a higher efficiency premium from the factions staying together, making it easier to maintain the equilibrium where the party stays united. Conversely, intensifying internal divisions or making the party organization less egalitarian (i.e., increasing ϕ) always incentivizes the weaker faction to split.

In our analysis below, we will see that while some of these intuitive results hold for forward-looking factions, others need to be qualified. In particular, we will show that damaging splits can emerge in equilibrium: dynamic incentives may push a faction to split even when this behavior

would never be statically optimal (i.e., when $k^i < 1$). Furthermore, the comparative statics results are richer, and under some conditions go in the opposite direction of what described above.

For clarity of exposition and to reduce the number of cases under consideration, but without much loss of generality for our qualitative results, we will assume that $r \geq 1$, so that the ideological camp is (weakly) gaining support over time. It is easy to prove that this implies that we can never have an equilibrium where the factions stay merged in the first period but split in the second, since the returns of the efficiency gain from being in the same party increases over time.

5. Equilibria

We now go back to the assumption that factions are forward-looking. Under $r \geq 1$, we have:

Proposition 1. *There exist unique $\underline{k}^i \leq \bar{k}^i$ such that, in equilibrium:*

- *The factions remain merged in both periods if $k^i < \underline{k}^i$;*
- *The factions split in the first period and remain split if $k^i > \bar{k}^i$;*
- *Finally, if $k^i \in [\underline{k}^i, \bar{k}^i]$, the factions split in the first period and re-merge in the second.*

The first and second bullet-points are intuitive, and mirror the static benchmark. When k^i is sufficiently large, i can run alone and avoid the need to share the pie while also cultivating its brand. Thus, the party splits in the first period and remains split. In contrast, when k^i is too low a split is too damaging (or not sufficiently beneficial to compensate for the loss of the efficiency premium $\alpha_m r^t$). Factions prefer to stay in the same party enjoying the efficiency gains from being together, and the party remains united for both periods.

More interesting, we see that for intermediate values of k^i , a cyclic equilibrium can emerge, in which the factions begin the game united, then split in the first period, only to re-merge in the second. Importantly, this cycle does not emerge because factions' statically optimal strategy changes over time.

This is evident from the fact that, as depicted in Figure 2 below, for some values of r this cyclic equilibrium is sustainable when $k^i < 1$, i.e., when the split always hurts the faction's static

payoff. Put differently, the emergence of the cycle equilibrium is not driven by the faction's short-term gains or static considerations. Rather, it reflects a dynamic strategic behavior where faction i expects that splitting in the first period will pave the way for a future, more advantageous merger in the second period. As a result, faction i may find it beneficial to split, even if this entails a static loss in the short run. Of course, for i to prefer a merger in the second period k^i cannot be too large. At the same time, k^i cannot be too small, to ensure that the static cost of the split in the first period is not too high.

Further, notice that for the cycle to be sustained, j must be able to credibly commit to merging in the second period. Corollary 1 follows straightforwardly:

Corollary 1. *There exists a unique \tilde{k}^j s.t. $\underline{k}^i < \bar{k}^i$ only if $k^j < \tilde{k}^j$.*




Figure 2 – Equilibria illustration for $k^i \in [0.5, 2]$, $r \in [2, 18]$. The orange region correspond to the stable split equilibrium, the blue region to the cycling equilibrium, and the green region to the stable merger equilibrium. The other parameters are set to $\alpha_m = 1$, $k^j = 0.5$, $b = 1$, $k^j = 0.5$.

5.1. The Logic of Cycles and Damaging Splits

Having established our equilibrium characterization, we now delve deeper into the logic underlying the emergence of cycles of mergers and splits. To provide a clearer understanding of the dynamics that give rise to these cycles we will specifically examine the scenario where $k^i < 1$, which results in a *statically damaging* split in the first period. As we will see, there are two possible types of dynamics that may drive this cycle, depending on whether $k^i > k^j$ or $k^i < k^j$.

1. $k^i > k^j$: bigger fish in smaller pond. First, suppose that a split damages *both* the splinter faction and the party as a whole: i.e., it depletes both factions' brands ($k^i, k^j < 1$). Here, when factions reunite in the second period, the party will be weaker than it would have been without the split, and faction i 's own brand will be less valuable. Nonetheless, it can still be advantageous for faction i to instigate the split if it inflicts an even greater damage on the opposing faction j (i.e., $k^j < k^i$). In this case, even if i 's *absolute* brand will have weakened, its position *relative* to the opposing faction j will have strengthened.

In other words, even if the party becomes weaker as a result of the cycle, faction i chooses to split today to enhance its standing in the party in the future. This decision is made precisely because faction i expects to merge back and reap the benefits of a weakened opposing faction: grabbing a bigger share of a smaller pie.

2. $k^j > k^i$: smaller fish in bigger pond. Next, suppose $k^i < 1 < k^j$, meaning that the split is damaging to the splinter faction's brand but improves the opposing faction's. In this case, the cost of the split is very high for faction i . Not only it imposes an immediate cost in the first period, but it also puts the faction in a weaker bargaining position within the party following the re-merge in the second period.

Although the cycling equilibrium may seem counterproductive, there exist circumstances that sustain it. Specifically, if $k^i < 1 < k^j$ and $k^i + k^j > 2$ the cycle damages the splinter but allows the other faction to consolidate its brand and ultimately helps the camp overall. Thus, when the party re-merges in the second period it is stronger than it would have been absent the split. In this scenario, faction j benefits from the cycling equilibrium since it strengthens both the camp

and its relative power. Meanwhile, the splinter faction i is prepared to bear the cost of splitting today and weakening its position because it expects that doing so will strengthen the party in the future. Again, i opts to split today precisely because it anticipates re-merging tomorrow, gaining a smaller share of a larger pie.

Finally, note that cycles can never emerge when $k^i < k^j < 1$: in this case a split damages the camp as a whole, hurts factions in the short run *and* damages the splinter faction's standing within the party. It is then straightforward that faction i never finds it profitable to split and re-merge in this case.¹⁰

6. Institutions and Splits

We now leverage our theoretical results from the previous sections to study how institutional features regulating competition across and within parties influence party stability and fragmentation.

6.1. Electoral Institutions

First, we study the impact of electoral institutions. In our setting, α_m quantifies the efficiency premium the factions gain when running in the same party. As such, this parameter represents the disproportionality of the electoral system. We find that, surprisingly, increasing α_m can incentivize splits and decrease the likelihood of a stable-merger equilibrium.

Proposition 2. *Suppose that $k^i > k^j$ and r is sufficiently large. Then, the stable-merger equilibrium is harder to sustain as α_m increases, and the cycle equilibrium is easier to maintain.*

As discussed above, under $k^i > k^j$, faction i has incentives to initiate a cycle and pay a cost today to grab a larger piece of the pie tomorrow. The larger α_m , the larger the pie, the stronger the incentives underlying this dynamics. Thus, increasing α_m will sometimes increase the parameter region sustaining a cycling equilibrium, instead eroding the stable-merger region.

This result suggests a simple yet neglected relationship between electoral institutions and intra-party incentives. Constitutional design scholars typically focus on the *static* incentives that

¹⁰However cycles could still happen under $k^i < k^j < 1$ if both factions could initiate cycles: we discuss this scenario in a separate section below.

institutions produce at the party level. A powerful intuition in this literature is that increasing the stakes of winning the election should reduce fragmentation by encouraging factions not to break ranks. In particular, Duverger’s law states that we should expect a less fragmented party system under more majoritarian electoral rules (Duverger, 1951). While this intuition is upheld in our model if factions merely consider their static payoffs, dynamic considerations may generate the opposite results, whereby α_m may induce a split in the first period, as highlighted in Proposition 2.

Importantly, the empirical evidence on the Duvergerian proposition is nuanced. Some studies found consistent results in cross-sectional analyses (Cox, 1997; Lijphart, 1994). Others, however, identify cases where the proposition fails, such as India (Diwakar, 2007) or Canada (Gaines, 1999). Furthermore, Singer (2013) provides mixed evidence on Duverger’s law from single-member district election outcomes in fifty-three countries.

Existing scholarship explains this mixed evidence by suggesting that Duverger forces may be *dampened* when voters or parties fail to act strategically (Cox, 1997), or because of societal cleavages that interact with electoral institutions (Ordeshook and Shvetsova, 1994). In contrast, Proposition 2 emphasizes that the Duvergerian intuition may need to be qualified, due to previously overlooked strategic considerations. Even if, statically, a Duvergerian logic is upheld, the effect of disproportionality on the effective number of parties may go in the *opposite* direction once we consider factions’ dynamic incentives.

6.2. Intra-Party Institutions

Following a similar logic, the next result shows that making the party organization less egalitarian (or increasing ideological divisions in the party) will only encourage a split initiated by the faction expecting to become a bigger fish in a smaller pond.

Proposition 3. *Suppose that $\underline{k}^i < \bar{k}^i$. Then,*

(i) *For $k^i > k^j$, \bar{k}^i is increasing and \underline{k}^i is decreasing in ϕ ;*

(ii) *For $k^i < k^j$, \bar{k}^i is decreasing and \underline{k}^i is increasing in ϕ .*

A larger ϕ captures a less egalitarian internal organization, with more resources going to the strongest faction, and/or a party platform that reflects less the ideological preferences of smaller

factions. As such, naïve intuition would suggest that increasing ϕ would consistently render a stable merger equilibrium more challenging to sustain. This is because, in a less egalitarian organization, the weaker factions’ participation constraints are harder to satisfy, potentially leading to factional splits. This intuition is validated in our model in the case of $k^i > k^j$, but not when $k^i < k^j$.

Recall that, under $k^i < k^j$, if a cycle emerges it is sustained by a “smaller fish in bigger pond” dynamic. The splinter faction is willing to pay an immediate cost and damage its standing within the party, in order to strengthen the party’s position. This dynamic is more profitable for the splinter faction as ϕ decreases: when the party is more cohesive or has a more egalitarian structure, i ’s cost of damaging its relative bargaining power (i.e., reducing $b_t^i - b_t^j$) is reduced. Thus, as ϕ increases this type of cycle equilibrium is harder to sustain, while the stable merger is easier to maintain.

In contrast, when $k^i > k^j$ the incentives underlying the cycle are for i to strengthen its relative standing within the party. As ϕ increases, these incentives become stronger. The cycling equilibrium region expands, eroding both the stable split and stable merger regions.

Our result, which shows that enhancing internal power sharing within political parties may either prevent or provoke splits, aligns with the heterogeneity observed in different empirical settings. For instance, scholars specializing in Southern U.S. politics have argued that Democrats endorsed primaries to maintain their one-party dominance by averting factional defections (Key, 1949). Conversely, other researchers have posited that introducing primaries might actually exacerbate internal conflicts (Burden, 2004).

Existing explanations for both the negative and positive impacts of intraparty power sharing typically rely on factions’ static ideological motives. Introducing primaries is thought to help build consensus among party members and legitimize the chosen candidate in the eyes of those not selected (Carey and Polga-Hecimovich, 2006).¹¹ However, defections might also be encouraged if the primary electorate selects a nominee who appeals to a smaller, more extreme group of party activists (Brady, Han and Pope, 2007).

¹¹For additional evidence indicating that primaries unify parties, see Hortalá-Vallve and Mueller (2015) and Ascencio (2023).

In contrast, Proposition 3 underscores the importance of taking into account factions' dynamic incentives to fully understand the consequences of party internal institutions, and shows that both sets of results may be rationalized within the same theoretical framework.

7. Robustness and Extensions

In this section we discuss the results' robustness to relaxing some of our assumptions from the baseline model.

7.1. Both Factions Can Split

The baseline model assumes for clarity of exposition that only faction i can initiate a split. We now examine the robustness of our results to the possibility of both factions initiating a split. Recall that, in the original model, faction i has the power to unilaterally initiate a split, while both factions must agree for a re-merger to occur. Consequently, it is clear that the parameter values that generate a stable split or a cycle in the original model also support these equilibria in the expanded version. However one may wonder whether the stable merger equilibrium can be sustained in this enriched setup, or whether it is always the case that, if one faction does not want to initiate a split, then the other does.

In the Appendix, we analyze this modified version of the model and demonstrate that, although the stable-merger region shrinks, there are still parameter values where a stable merger equilibrium exists.

Proposition 4. *There exist unique \underline{k}^i and \underline{k}^j s.t. a stable merger equilibrium exists iff $k^i < \underline{k}^i$ and $k^j < \underline{k}^j$.*

Intuitively, for the equilibrium to persist when j can also split, it is crucial that both k^i and k^j are small enough such that neither faction has an incentive to initiate a split and break away from the party.

7.2. Bargaining among factions

Thus far, we have assumed that the distribution of resources within the political party is determined by its internal organization and institutions (represented by the parameter ϕ), which

remain constant over time. However, this raises the question of whether allowing factions to bargain over the internal division of the spoils could prevent the efficiency losses associated with a cycle that involves a damaging split in the first period. Such bargaining could be particularly advantageous if it prevents the ‘bigger fish in a smaller pond’ cycle, where one faction initiates a split that harms both its opponent and the faction as a whole.

To answer this question, we explore an extension of our baseline model where the division of the pie within the party is determined endogenously in each period. More precisely, the factions start the game together as in the baseline model. One faction is selected to make a proposal. If this proposal is accepted by the other faction, the party remains united and the proposed division is implemented. If not, the factions split.

In the second period, a new round of bargaining takes place. If the factions are merged at the beginning of the period, bargaining unfolds as described above. Suppose instead the factions are split. Then, one is recognized to be the proposer and chooses whether to propose a merger and, if so, a division of the spoils. If the other faction agrees, the merger occurs and the proposed division is implemented. If not, the factions remain split.

The likelihood of a faction being selected as the proposer in each period is a function of the relative strength of its brand at the beginning of that period. We note that the equilibrium of this game is equivalent to the one that would emerge if the internal division of the pie is determined by Nash Bargaining, under appropriately chosen weight parameters.

In this section, it is useful to generalize the assumption on how the strength of the ideological camp evolves over time. In particular, we assume that, in $t = 2$, the strength of the camp is given by $\alpha_m r^\gamma$. As in the baseline, in $t = 1$ the strength of the camp is given by $\alpha_m r$. The parameter $\gamma > 0$ then captures the speed at which the ideological camp strengthens, or weakens, over time (in the baseline, $\gamma = 2$). We maintain the assumption that $r > 1$, so that a higher γ implies that the camp gets stronger in the second period.

Then, we have:

Proposition 5. *There exists a $\underline{\gamma}$ such that, if $\gamma > \underline{\gamma}$, a cycle emerges in equilibrium.*

It is intuitive that, for a sufficiently large γ , factions will be incentivized to merge (or remain merged) in the second period, in order to enjoy the efficiency premium. Therefore, their second-

period payoff depends on the outcome of the internal bargaining process which will determine the division of the pie. Intuitively, the more a faction consolidates its brand in the first period, the stronger its bargaining position in the second, and the higher its equilibrium share of the pie. Consider then the factions' first-period incentives. Suppose that $k^i > k^j$, with a symmetric logic applying to $k^i < k^j$. A split in the first-period imposes a large cost on faction j , both today and tomorrow. Thus, we can always find parameter values such that faction j is willing to strike a bargain in the first period: offer i part (or even all) of its first-period share in order to avoid a split. However, we find that faction i is often unwilling to take the deal. Even if j were to offer the entire pie in the first period, this may not be enough to dissuade i from initiating a damaging cycle.

In particular, when γ is sufficiently high, cycles become inevitable, as factions cannot negotiate beforehand to prevent splits.¹² Faction i anticipates that improving its relative brand will improve its bargaining position in the second period, and thus its equilibrium share of the pie. As a consequence, it faces dynamic incentives very similar to those highlighted in the baseline model, and it is willing to pay a cost today to get a larger share of the pie tomorrow.

The party thus falls victim to a dynamic resource curse: The resources available today are insufficient to compensate the splinter faction for the higher gains it expects in the future. This highlights a fundamental issue with the allocation of resources within the party: while future party resources are high, factions cannot make binding agreements today on how to split the spoils tomorrow. In fact, in the context of a cycle, any promise made by faction j to offer a larger share of the pie (than it is statically optimal) to faction i in the second period is not credible. This is because faction i is willing to re-merge even without this offer, which means that faction j has no incentives to follow through on the promise. This commitment problem leads to an inefficiency, as the party's overall resources are depleted over time.¹³

¹²Another possible reason for bargaining failure, which we do not consider here, is information asymmetry. If factions have private information about the possible consequences of a split, the familiar logic from the conflict bargaining literature may lead to an inefficient outcome (see e.g., [Fearon 1995](#)).

¹³The result is also reminiscent of [Powell \(2004\)](#), who shows how large, rapid changes in the bargainers' relative power cause inefficiency, even with complete information.

7.3. Other Considerations

We now consider a few additional potential extensions of the model and discuss how they might affect our qualitative insights.

First, we could allow k^i and k^j to be a function of r^t , the ideological leaning of the electorate. Intuitively, one may expect the success of the two factions after a split to be related to the ideological strength of the camp as whole. Importantly, this need not fundamentally change our qualitative insights. The model focuses on the net effect of the split, taking into account the ideological leaning of the electorate and all other relevant factors. As long as these factors are captured by the parameter k , the precise functional form of k is less important.

Second, one might think that the effect on a faction's brand generated by a split is not long-lasting if factions re-merge in the same party again. Suppose for example, that the splinter faction presents itself as appealing to a more extreme and 'ideologically pure' portion of the electorate. This allows the faction to cultivate a certain identity, or brand. It seems plausible, then, that some of this identity may be lost should the faction re-merge again with its moderate counterpart. To capture this intuition, we could allow re-merging to dampen some of the effect of splits on the factions' brands. This could be done by introducing a parameter that captures the degree to which a re-merged faction retains the same brand accumulated during the split. Again, this extension would not change our qualitative insights as long as the effect of re-merging is not so strong as to completely erase the gains or losses incurred from the split.

Finally, as briefly discussed above, we could allow brands to evolve somewhat during merger periods. That is, factions could still develop their own ideological identity, or organizational capacity, thus differentiating from each other while in the same party. This is especially true in parties that allow for internal competition, for example through primaries. Similarly to the previous case, we could introduce a parameter that captures the extent to which factions' brands evolve when factions are within the party. As long as the evolution is muted compared to after a split, our main results would still hold.

8. Conclusion

Most party systems frequently witness significant political changes, with splits and mergers of political parties taking center stage. This has led to a growing interest among scholars and political observers in understanding the complex dynamics of party politics and factionalism. This paper develops a theory to explain why factions belonging to the same party might choose to split, and when instead we should expect party unity.

Our model produces some intuitive results. On the one hand, when a faction benefits a lot from splitting (e.g., because the new faction leadership gains visibility or voters perceive the new party as ideologically pure), in equilibrium party unity is not sustainable, and different factions diverge on their own separate paths. On the other hand, when the benefit of running together is very high (perhaps because voters tend to punish a divided camp), factions do not split in equilibrium, thus providing a possible explanation for party system stability.

Other results generated by our model are more surprising. We show that factions may split from their party even when, by doing so, they damage both themselves and their ideological camp. These damaging splits can only be sustained in equilibrium as part of a ‘cycle’, whereby factions split today only to re-merge tomorrow. One dynamic that might sustain such a cycle is when a split damages both factions, but the splinter faction anticipates that by temporarily distancing itself it will improve its relative standing within the party, thus becoming a bigger fish in a smaller pond. A second, perhaps less intuitive dynamic occurs when a split harms the splinter faction but benefits the remaining one. The splinter faction pays a cost today to strengthen the party tomorrow, thus becoming a smaller fish in a bigger pond.

These different dynamics generate rich comparative statics, whereby forces that would intuitively push towards party stability in a static setting may actually incentivize splits in equilibrium in our model. For instance, we find that more majoritarian electoral systems may induce factions to split today as part of a cycle equilibrium. In a similar fashion, enhancing power-sharing within the party (for example, through the adoption of primaries) does not necessarily foster party unity. In light of mixed empirical evidence on the effect of institutions on party stability, our findings propose an explanation which focuses on factions’ dynamic incentives.

Our model predominantly concentrates on factions within parties, but its insights can be extrapolated to pre-electoral coalitions. Each party within a coalition possesses a distinct brand, which may evolve differently depending on its coalition status. Analogous to our model, the decision to exit a coalition can either fortify or diminish a party's brand. Our model's focus on dynamic incentives faced by coalition partners then offers valuable insights for understanding the frequent formation and dissolution of alliances in multi-party systems.

While our results would persist in a world with limited uncertainty about the consequences of splits, a natural question to ask is how facing substantive uncertainty would change factions' incentives to split. While we speculate that the equilibria we uncover persist, a richer set of incentives may emerge in a high-uncertain world. For example, in such a setting splits might happen for experimentation: while factions have a perception of what could happen if they split when they belong to the same party, it is only when the split actually occurs that these perceptions become unequivocal signals and can thus impact their bargaining power. We believe that analyzing factions' incentives to experiment in this more complex setup is perhaps the most promising avenue for future theoretical research building on our model.

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Appendix

Proof of Proposition 1. To prove this proposition, we will proceed as follows. First, we will show that there exists no equilibrium where the factions remain merged in the first period and split in the second. Next, we identify conditions for existence of the three equilibria characterized in the Proposition. Finally, we will establish equilibrium existence and uniqueness.

Conjecture an equilibrium where the factions remain merged in the first period and split in the second. First, consider faction i 's choice to split in $t = 2$ given that factions were merged in $t = 1$. This is optimal if and only if

$$b_0 k^i > b_0 + \frac{\alpha_m r^2}{2}, \quad (3)$$

which requires $k^i > 1$.

To evaluate factions' behavior in the first period, we need to consider the possible off-path conditions. First, suppose that the equilibrium prescribes factions to stay split after a deviation in $t = 1$. In this case, the equilibrium requires:

$$b_0 + \frac{\alpha_m r}{2} > b_0 (k^i)^2, \quad (4)$$

which contradicts condition 3.

Next, suppose that the equilibrium prescribes factions to merge after a deviation in $t = 1$, that is:

$$b_0 (k^i)^2 < (b_0 (k^i + k^j) + \alpha_m r^2) \left(\frac{1}{2} + \phi b_0 (k^i - k^j) \right). \quad (5)$$

Then, the equilibrium requires that in $t = 1$:

$$b_0 + \frac{\alpha_m r}{2} > (b_0 (k^i + k^j) + \alpha_m r^2) \left(\frac{1}{2} + \phi b_0 (k^i - k^j) \right), \quad (6)$$

The last two conditions imply

$$b_0 (k^i)^2 < b_0 + \frac{\alpha_m r}{2}, \quad (7)$$

which contradicts the second period equilibrium condition (3).

We will now move to identifying conditions for the existence of the three equilibria characterized in the Proposition.

Stable splits.

By backward induction, consider faction i 's choice to split in $t = 2$, given that factions split in $t = 1$. Faction i splits in equilibrium if and only if:

$$b_0(k^i)^2 > [b_0(k^i + k^j) + \alpha_m r^2] \left[\frac{1}{2} + \phi b_0(k^i - k^j) \right]. \quad (8)$$

Which rearranges to

$$b_0(k^i)^2 - [b_0(k^i + k^j) + \alpha_m r^2] \left[\frac{1}{2} + \phi b_0(k^i - k^j) \right] > 0. \quad (9)$$

Differentiating the LHS with respect to k^i we obtain

$$b_0 \left(-\frac{1}{2} + (2 - 2b_0\phi)k^i - \alpha_m \phi r^2 \right),$$

so the LHS is increasing and convex in k^i . This follows from the assumption that $\phi < \frac{1}{2b_0\bar{k}^2}$. The condition is never satisfied at $k^i = 0$, therefore it must establish a lower bound. It is easy to see that this lower bound is lower than \bar{k} for a sufficiently large \bar{k} (i.e., the lower bound is finite).

Alternatively, it could be that factions split in $t = 2$ if i prefers to merge (Equation 8 does not hold) but j does not:

$$b_0(k^j)^2 > [b_0(k^i + k^j) + \alpha_m r^2] \left[\frac{1}{2} + \phi b_0(k^j - k^i) \right]. \quad (10)$$

Notice that, as for 8, condition also 10 establishes a lower bound \underline{k}^j such that factions split for $k^j > \underline{k}^j$.

Consider now faction i 's choice to split in $t = 1$. On the equilibrium path, this yields an overall payoff of:

$$b_0 k^i + b_0 (k^i)^2. \quad (11)$$

First, suppose that the equilibrium prescribes factions to stay merged after a deviation in $t = 1$. This off-path behavior requires no incentive to split, that is:

$$\frac{1}{2} [2b_0 + \alpha_m r^2] > b_0 k^i. \quad (12)$$

Given Equation 12, faction i splits in $t = 1$ in equilibrium if and only if:

$$b_0 k^i + b_0 (k^i)^2 > 2b_0 + \frac{1}{2} \alpha_m r (1 + r), \quad (13)$$

Alternatively, suppose that the equilibrium prescribes faction i to split after a deviation in $t = 1$ (i.e., condition 12 does not hold). Then, faction i splits in $t = 1$ if:

$$b_0 k^i + b_0 (k^i)^2 > \frac{1}{2} (2b_0 + \alpha_m r) + b_0 k^i. \quad (14)$$

Both conditions (13) and (14) establish lower bounds on k^i : in particular, (13) is binding if condition (12) holds. Otherwise, (14) is binding. Furthermore, recall that (8) also establishes a lower bound for k^i . We denote the binding lower bound among the three as \bar{k}^i .¹⁴

Stable mergers.

By backward induction, consider faction i 's choice to stay merged in $t = 2$, given that factions were merged in $t = 1$. This choice is optimal if and only if

$$b_0 + \frac{1}{2} (\alpha_m r^2) > b_0 k^i. \quad (15)$$

To evaluate factions' behavior in the first period, we need to consider the possible off-path conditions. First, suppose that the equilibrium prescribes factions to merge after a deviation in $t = 1$. That is, either i wants to remain split in $t = 2$:

$$b_0 (k^i)^2 > [b_0 (k^i + k^j) + \alpha_m r^2] \left[\frac{1}{2} + \phi b_0 (k^i - k^j) \right], \quad (16)$$

¹⁴Note that the stable split equilibrium may be sustained if (8) fails, as long as (10) is satisfied. Thus, which one is the binding lower bound on k^i also depends on whether k^j satisfies (10).

or i wants to merge but j does not: i.e., condition (16) does not hold and

$$b_0(k^j)^2 > [b_0(k^i + k^j) + \alpha_m r^2] \left[\frac{1}{2} + \phi b_0(k^j - k^i) \right]. \quad (17)$$

Thus, in the first period, faction i does not split if and only if:

$$\frac{1}{2}(2b_0 + \alpha_m r) + \frac{1}{2}(2b_0 + \alpha_m r^2) > b_0 k^i + b_0(k^i)^2, \quad (18)$$

which establishes an upper bound on k^i .

Suppose instead that factions re-merge after a deviation, which requires:

$$[b_0(k^i + k^j) + \alpha_m r^2] \left[\frac{1}{2} + \phi b_0(k^i - k^j) \right] > b_0(k^i)^2, \quad (19)$$

and

$$[b_0(k^i + k^j) + \alpha_m r^2] \left[\frac{1}{2} + \phi b_0(k^j - k^i) \right] > b_0(k^j)^2. \quad (20)$$

In this case, in $t = 1$, faction i does not split if and only if:

$$\frac{1}{2}(2b_0 + \alpha_m r) + \frac{1}{2}(2b_0 + \alpha_m r^2) > b_0 k^i + [b_0(k^i + k^j) + \alpha_m r^2] \left[\frac{1}{2} + \phi b_0(k^i - k^j) \right]. \quad (21)$$

Which again establishes an upper bound on k^i . Thus, depending on the parameter values either (15), (18) or (21) will be binding, and there exists a unique \underline{k}^i s.t. a stable merger equilibrium exists if and only if $k^i < \underline{k}^i$.

Cycles.

Consider factions' choice to merge in $t = 2$, given that there is a split in $t = 1$. Both factions need to profit from merging, i.e.,

$$[b_0(k^i + k^j) + \alpha_m r^2] \left[\frac{1}{2} + \phi b_0(k^i - k^j) \right] > b_0(k^i)^2 \quad (22)$$

and

$$[b_0(k^i + k^j) + \alpha_m r^2] \left[\frac{1}{2} + \phi b_0(k^j - k^i) \right] > b_0(k^j)^2, \quad (23)$$

which establish upper bounds on both k^i and k^j .

Consider now the first period behavior. First, suppose that the equilibrium prescribes factions to stay merged after a deviation, i.e. condition (12) holds. This implies that faction i splits in equilibrium if and only if:

$$b_0 k^i + [b_0(k^i + k^j) + \alpha_m r^2] \left[\frac{1}{2} + \phi b_0(k^i - k^j) \right] > 2b_0 + \frac{1}{2} (\alpha_m r + \alpha_m r^2), \quad (24)$$

which requires that k^i is high enough.

Alternatively, suppose that the equilibrium prescribes factions to split after a deviation in $t = 1$ (i.e., condition 12 does not hold). This implies that faction i splits in equilibrium if and only if:

$$b_0 k^i + [b_0(k^i + k^j) + \alpha_m r^2] \left[\frac{1}{2} + \phi b_0(k^i - k^j) \right] > 2b_0 + \frac{1}{2} (\alpha_m r) + b_0 k^i, \quad (25)$$

which rearranges to

$$[b_0(k^i + k^j) + \alpha_m r^2] \left[\frac{1}{2} + \phi b_0(k^i - k^j) \right] - 2b_0 - \frac{1}{2} (\alpha_m r) > 0. \quad (26)$$

By inspection, we can see that the LHS is convex in k^i .

Together with (22) and (23) then, (24) and (25) imply that there exist \bar{k}^j , \underline{k}^i and \bar{k}^i s.t. a cycle equilibrium exists iff $k^i \in [\underline{k}^i, \bar{k}^i]$ and $k^j < \bar{k}^j$.

Finally, we establish that a pure strategy equilibrium always exists, and that the equilibrium is unique, except for a measure-zero set of parameter values.

First, notice that we cannot sustain mixed strategy in the first period with pure strategies in the second. Next, it is easy to see that only a measure-zero set of parameters can sustain indifference in the second period. Thus, except for this measure-zero set, the equilibrium must be in pure strategy, and (under $r > 1$) the equilibrium must be one of the three characterized above.

We now establish uniqueness. First, notice that there exist no parameter values for which both a stable split and a cycle equilibrium exist, since conditions (22) and (23) are the complements of conditions (8) and (10), respectively.

Next, notice that there exist no parameter values for which both a stable merger and a stable splits equilibrium exist. Suppose that a stable splits equilibrium exists. Then, a possible stable merger equilibrium may only be sustained with a strategy prescribing that i splits and factions remain split off the equilibrium path and conditions $b_0 + \frac{1}{2}\alpha_m r^2 > b_0 k^i$ and $2b_0 + \frac{1}{2}\alpha_m r(1+r) > b_0 k^i(1+k^i)$. In turn, if $b_0 + \frac{1}{2}\alpha_m r^2 > b_0 k^i$ then the stable split equilibrium can only be sustained by a strategy prescribing that factions never split off the equilibrium path. However, this would require $2b_0 + \frac{1}{2}\alpha_m r(1+r) < b_0 k^i(1+k^i)$, which contradicts the previous condition.

Finally, there exists no parameter value for which both a stable merger and a cycle equilibrium exist. Suppose that a cycle equilibrium exists. Then, a possible stable merger equilibrium may only be sustained with a strategy prescribing that i splits and factions re-merge off the equilibrium path and conditions $b_0 + \frac{1}{2}\alpha_m r^2 > b_0 k^i$ and $2b_0 + \frac{1}{2}\alpha_m r(1+r) > b_0 k^i + (b_0(k^i + k^j) + \alpha_m r^2)(\frac{1}{2} + \phi b_0(k^i - k^j))$. In turn, if $b_0 + \frac{1}{2}\alpha_m r^2 > b_0 k^i$ then the cycle equilibrium can only be sustained by a merger-merger off-path. However, this would require $2b_0 + \frac{1}{2}\alpha_m r(1+r) < b_0 k^i + (b_0(k^i + k^j) + \alpha_m r^2)(\frac{1}{2} + \phi b_0(k^i - k^j))$.

Therefore, there can be no overlap in the regions sustaining different equilibria, i.e., it must be the case that $\widehat{k}^i = \underline{k}^i \leq \bar{k}^i = \widetilde{k}^i$. \square

Proof of Corollary 1. Follows from the conditions identified above. \square

Proof of Proposition 3. Follows from inspection of the existence conditions. \square

Proof of Proposition 2. Suppose that r is sufficiently large that 15, 19 and 20 hold. Then, in equilibrium we have a stable merger if

$$b_0 k^i + [b_0(k^i + k^j) + \alpha_m r^2] \left[\frac{1}{2} + \phi b_0(k^i - k^j) \right] - 2b_0 - \frac{1}{2}(\alpha_m r + \alpha_m r^2) < 0, \quad (27)$$

and a cycle if

$$b_0 k^i + [b_0(k^i + k^j) + \alpha_m r^2] \left[\frac{1}{2} + \phi b_0(k^i - k^j) \right] - 2b_0 - \frac{1}{2}(\alpha_m r + \alpha_m r^2) > 0. \quad (28)$$

Differentiating the LHS wrt to α_m we get

$$r\phi b_0(k^i - k^j) - \frac{1}{2}, \quad (29)$$

which is positive for a sufficiently large r . \square

Proof of Proposition 4. Intuitively, if we consider parameter values for which we would have a stable split in equilibrium in the baseline, we continue to have a stable split in this case. Similarly, because a re-merger always requires j 's consent, under the conditions sustaining a cycle in the baseline we continue to have a cycle here. Thus, here we will focus on the case in which $k^i < \underline{k}^i$, i.e., in the baseline we have a stable merger in equilibrium.

Here, we will show that while allowing j to split erodes the stable-merger region, this kind of equilibrium continues to arise for some parameter values.

We proceed exactly as in the proof for the baseline case.

By backward induction, consider faction j 's choice to stay merged in $t = 2$, given that factions were merged in $t = 1$. This choice is optimal iff

$$b_0 + \frac{1}{2}(\alpha_m r^2) > b_0 k^j. \quad (30)$$

To evaluate factions' behavior in the first period, we need to consider the possible off-path conditions. First, suppose that the equilibrium prescribes factions to remain split after a deviation in $t = 1$. That is, either i wants to remain split in $t = 2$:

$$b_0(k^i)^2 > [b_0(k^i + k^j) + \alpha_m r^2] \left[\frac{1}{2} + \phi b_0(k^i - k^j) \right], \quad (31)$$

or i wants to merge but j does not: i.e., Equation 31 does not hold and

$$b_0(k^j)^2 > [b_0(k^i + k^j) + \alpha_m r^2] \left[\frac{1}{2} + \phi b_0(k^j - k^i) \right]. \quad (32)$$

Thus, in the first period, faction j does not split if and only if:

$$\frac{1}{2}(2b_0 + \alpha_m r) + \frac{1}{2}(2b_0 + \alpha_m r^2) > b_0 k^j + b_0 (k^j)^2, \quad (33)$$

which establishes an upper bound on k^j .

Suppose instead that factions re-merge after a deviation, which requires:

$$[b_0(k^i + k^j) + \alpha_m r^2] \left[\frac{1}{2} + \phi b_0(k^i - k^j) \right] > b_0 (k^i)^2, \quad (34)$$

and

$$[b_0(k^i + k^j) + \alpha_m r^2] \left[\frac{1}{2} + \phi b_0(k^j - k^i) \right] > b_0 (k^j)^2. \quad (35)$$

In this case, in $t = 1$, faction j does not split if and only if:

$$\frac{1}{2}(2b_0 + \alpha_m r) + \frac{1}{2}(2b_0 + \alpha_m r^2) > b_0 k^j + [b_0(k^i + k^j) + \alpha_m r^2] \left[\frac{1}{2} - \phi b_0(k^i - k^j) \right]. \quad (36)$$

Which again establishes an upper bound on k^j . Thus, depending on the parameter values either [30](#), [33](#) or [36](#) will be binding, and there exists a unique \underline{k}^j s.t. a stable merger equilibrium exists if and only if $k^j < \underline{k}^j$. \square

Proof of Proposition 5. Proceeding by backward induction, we characterize the equilibrium of the second-period subgame. Let $\beta_t^i(b_{t-1}^i, b_{t-1}^j)$ be the probability that i is selected as the proposer in period t , as a function of the factions' brands at the beginning of the period (i.e., the brands inherited from $t - 1$). Further, denote as $x_j^p(i)$ and $x_i^p(i)$ the share of the pie which proposal p from faction i allocates to factions j and i , respectively.

Suppose i gets recognized as the proposer in period 2. Then, assuming an interior solution, if i proposes a merger/staying merged, it will propose an x_j^p s.t. j is indifferent between being together or apart. This solves

$$(b_1^i + b_1^j + \alpha_m r^\gamma) x_j^p(i) = b_1^j k^j, \quad (37)$$

which yields

$$x_j^p(i) = \frac{b_1^j k^j}{b_1^i + b_1^j + \alpha_m r^\gamma}. \quad (38)$$

Notice that the solution is always strictly larger than 0 and, for a sufficiently high γ , smaller than 1. Given 38, i chooses to propose a merger/staying merged rather than splitting/remaining split if and only if

$$\left(1 - \frac{b_1^j k^j}{b_1^i + b_1^j + \alpha_m r^\gamma}\right)(b_1^i + b_1^j + \alpha_m r^\gamma) > b_1^i k^i. \quad (39)$$

Which is again always satisfied for a sufficiently high γ .

A similar analysis establishes that if faction j is selected in period 2 and proposes a merger, the proposed allocation will be

$$x_i^p(j) = \frac{b_1^i k^i}{b_1^i + b_1^j + \alpha_m r^\gamma}. \quad (40)$$

Then, j prefers to propose a merger/staying merged rather than than splitting/remaining split if and only if

$$\left(1 - \frac{b_1^i k^i}{b_1^i + b_1^j + \alpha_m r^\gamma}\right)(b_1^i + b_1^j + \alpha_m r^\gamma) > b_1^j k^j. \quad (41)$$

Suppose then that γ is sufficiently large that the 38 and 40 are interior, and 39 and 41 are satisfied.

Moving backwards, a sufficient condition to ensure that a split emerges in equilibrium in period 1, regardless of which faction is selected as the proposer, is that one faction always prefers to split even if the other is willing to offer the entire first-period pie. Consider faction i . Denote by $\Gamma(b_1^i, b_1^j)$ the expected second period payoff of faction i , given the brands inherited from first period. In equilibrium:

$$\begin{aligned} \Gamma(b_1^i, b_1^j) = & \beta_2^i(b_1^i, b_1^j) \left((b_1^i + b_1^j + \alpha_m r^\gamma) \left(1 - \frac{b_1^j k^j}{b_1^i + b_1^j + \alpha_m r^\gamma}\right) \right) \\ & + (1 - \beta_2^i(b_1^i, b_1^j)) \left((b_1^i + b_1^j + \alpha_m r^\gamma) \frac{b_1^i k^i}{b_1^i + b_1^j + \alpha_m r^\gamma} \right), \end{aligned} \quad (42)$$

where the values of b_1^i and b_1^j depend on the factions' decision to split or merge in the first period.

Then, sufficient condition to ensure that i prefers a split in the first period is

$$b_0 k^i + \Gamma(b_0 k^i, b_0 k^i) > 2b_0 + \alpha_m r + \Gamma(b_0, b_0). \quad (43)$$

Substituting in the value of $\Gamma(b_1^i, b_1^j)$, notice that we can rewrite $\Gamma(b_0 k^i, b_0 k^i) - \Gamma(b_0, b_0)$ as $(\beta_2^i(b_0 k^i, b_0 k^i) - \beta_2^i(b_0, b_0))\alpha_m r^\gamma + \Delta$, where Δ is not a function of γ . Then, 43 reduces to

$$\begin{aligned} (\beta_2^i(b_0 k^i, b_0 k^i) - \beta_2^i(b_0, b_0))\alpha_m r^\gamma + \Delta > \\ 2b_0 + \alpha_m r - b_0 k^i. \end{aligned} \quad (44)$$

Suppose $k^i > k^j$. Then, $\beta_2^i(b_0 k^i, b_0 k^i) - \beta_2^i(b_0, b_0) > 0$, by assumption, and the condition is always satisfied for a sufficiently high γ .

Proceeding in the same way we can show that, for a sufficiently high γ , j always prefers a split in the first-period if $k^j > k^i$.